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ABSTRACT

In debate, the affirmative case is changing so that the traditional needs-plan-advantages and comparative advantages cases are no longer the only ways to debate the affirmative. This paper discusses the two models of the affirmative case--the stock issue and systems models--and describes seven of the affirmative case possibilities: needs-plan-advantages, comparative advantages, goals criteria, alternative justification, effect oriented, on balance, and comparative need. It concludes that while Arthur N. Kruger questions the justification of using the newer affirmatives, they are nevertheless being used by debaters all over the nation. (JH)

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THE STATE OF THE AFFIRMATIVE CASE

by Donald Klopff*

"Debate," said David A. Thomas, "has changed."¹ When he uttered those words, Thomas was not offering a truism, a statement whose truth is so widely known that its utterance appears superfluous, because one phase of the educational process that never seemed to change was debate. As least Lawrence R. Wheelles so argued based on his examination of² tournament debating. Thomas' pronouncement partially resulted because he realized that the affirmative case has changed. He noted:

At one time there were only two basic affirmative case structures that were acceptable: the traditional inherency case . . . and the newer comparative advantages case that gained popularity in the 1960's. Today, there is a wide variety of affirmative analytical approaches in use ³

Besides the traditional needs-plan-advantages and the comparative advantages cases, in use today are the comparative need, goals-criteria, alternative-justification, on-balance, and effects-oriented cases. All are recent developments.

This plethoric state of the affirmative case probably had its genesis in the source identified by forensic wag, John E. Baird, who wrote, "Show me a debater who cannot read the manuscript of his affirmative speech, and I will show you a coach with terrible penmanship."⁴ This Baird aphorism doesn't explain the cause of a surfeit of affirmative cases regardless of author, coach or student. The reasons may be the following which William Reynolds drew out of the recent debate literature: (1) the

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open-ended, ambiguously worded national topics whose boundaries extend⁵ as far as ingenious linguistic analysis can take them; (2) the result of forcing students to continue debating a single question throughout the year, long after its significant approaches have been exploited; (3) the wayward game debate has become whose paramount end it winning and who means characteristically include strategems, tricks, and gimmicks.⁶

But Reynolds doesn't object to the cases as such. He concedes, "I have no trouble accepting the legitimacy of these forms and structures because I think that they are products of honest efforts in the past to highlight the issues implicit in propositions in a way that reveals the real base of choice."⁷ He cites three examples to demonstrate what he means:

Impetus for the comparative advantage approach was found in situations where two competing policy systems were indistinguishable with respect to their ability to solve compelling social problems. The criteria case, in one sense, evolved from a necessity to evaluate national objectives in terms of acknowledged social values and norms. The alternative justification case assumes that the manifestations of such complex social problems as the energy crisis are found in unique causal factors whose effects and solutions must be analyzed independently.⁸

Reynolds quarrels with the way they are used. Although the traditional case has general application in his thinking, he contends that the other forms are not applicable to every debate proposition. Yet they are often used as though they do have universal application. Success one year with a particular case, he believes, almost certainly guarantees its use in subsequent years regardless of whether it clearly and accurately organizes the issues implicit in the later propositions. Debaters make the issues fit the format rather than the format fit the issues.⁹ Reynolds'

assessment could be accurate. Debaters, or coaches if Baird's aphorism has a factual base, tend to jump on the bandwagon. Yet another, more fundamental reason could be responsible for the increasing number of affirmative cases.

Reynolds alludes to that reason when he refers to "competing policy systems" in his remarks concerning the comparative advantages case.

Bernard L. Brock, James W. Cheseloro, John F. Cragen, and James F. Klumpp examine that concept in Public Policy Decision-Making: Systems Analysis and Comparative Advantages Debate.¹⁰ Most debate propositions involve competing policy systems. Therefore, they urge the use of systems analysis based on general systems theory as an intellectual framework¹¹ for argumentation, particularly for competitive academic debate.

For years academic debaters have studied debate topics from the "stock issues" perspective. The traditional case, for instance, bases its analysis on the stock issues model. Ignored were newer models of analyzing policy systems which are quite different from the stock issues one. Brock, et. al. argue that the newer models of systems analysis offer new potential for topic analysis in academic debate. Understanding the present state of the affirmative case may be made easier by understanding the two models, the stock issue and systems models.

Models of Analysis

The stock model of analysis is so well-known that a simple explanation should suffice. The model requires the affirmative and negative to defend their position in the debate on the basis of six stock issues. These are:

1. Is there a need for change? Is there a problem in existence

which needs to be solved?

2. Is the problem, or the cause of the problem, an inherent part of the status quo?
3. Would the action suggested by the debate resolution eliminate the inherent problem?
4. Is it reasonable to assume that the plan implied by the resolution could be implemented if it were found desirable?
5. Would the plans suggested by the proposition be free from serious and detrimental side effects if they were put into operation?
6. Is the policy stated in the proposition the best way to eliminate the problem?

Using this model, the affirmative has certain responsibilities to carry out and its case is normally developed around them. McBurney and Mills state the responsibilities rather clearly:

An analysis of any proposition of policy will show that there are four responsibilities the affirmative must be prepared to discharge: (1) show that evils or problems exist, (2) show that these evils are produced by causes that can be remedied, (3) show that the action or policy proposed provides a remedy, and (4) show that this remedy is practicable in terms of cost, new problems it might create, and other possible remedies. For quick reference these may be referred to as "ill," "blame," "cure," and "cost."¹²

The needs-plan-advantages case is derived from this well-known model of analysis. The newer systems model deserves more attention and the lengthier explanation of it which follows comes from Klumpp, Brock, Cheseboro, and Cragen. Their systems model assumes a complexity of actions and conditions which are interrelated to numerous other actions and conditions within the socio-political framework of public policy. This complexity is characterized by multiple causation, equifinality, and multiple effects.

Multiple causation rejects the belief that one factor may be isolated as the cause of another. Instead, there are a number of

simultaneously occurring conditions which contribute to an extremely complex causal relationship. A socio-political problem, for example, could involve an exigency, the attitudes of those who make public policy or who implement such policies, and the structure under which those individuals operate. To illustrate, each New Year's Eve dozens of Honolulu residents are injured by exploding firecrackers. A law banning fireworks would eliminate the problem. In order to pass the law, its proponents would have to consider the multiple factors that come to play in this situation. The exigency itself is a factor. Also important is the attitude of the largely Oriental population which considers exploding firecrackers a significant religious, cultural, and historical way of celebrating certain occasions. The political and law enforcement structures in Honolulu are also critical. The politicians draw votes from the Orientals; many are Oriental and attach importance to the use of fireworks. Likewise, many of the police are Oriental and may be inclined to overlook infractions of a fireworks ban. They may simply be too busy on New Year's Eve with more serious violations of the law. As a consequence of these multiple factors, Honolulu has failed to ban fireworks.

Equifinality, the second characteristic, assumes that a number of different causal complexes can have identical effects. Inflation, for instance, can result from a number of complex causal relationships--supply and demand, labor-management negotiations, and inflationary psychology, to name a few. Any one of these causal systems, however, may in itself create inflation.

The Multiple effects characteristic suggests that any one change in a system will effect other relationships within that system. Banning fireworks in Honolulu will result in a economic hardship for fireworks'

sellers, will alter ceremonial procedures in many religions, and will add to the police's burden.¹³

Such a system for analyzing public policy isolates these points of judgment: "(1) the alternative courses of action open or available within one's influence, (2) the likely effects of pursuing each of the alternatives, (3) the probability of the various effects, (4) the value of each effect, and (5) attitude toward risk and probability."¹⁴ Thus, the single dominant cause relationship argument of the traditional model is replaced by a model which accommodates multiple causality, suggesting many alternatives with many effects. These are related by probability arguments and sorted by arguments comparing advantages and disadvantages. Consideration is also given to the priority of goals because of the value of effects. Multiple effects imply a trade-off among goals and the values must be weighed.

The stock issues model, Klumpp, *et. al.* claim, uses the concept of prima-facie case as a standard by which debaters argue, making the acceptance or rejection of the status quo critical early in the debate. The systems model makes the critical judgment additive and comparative with the policy judgment a final step. The policy alternatives will have many effects. Judgment follows, first, the assessment of the probability and value of each effect for each alternative and, next, the weighing of these against the effects of the other alternatives including that of the status quo. This weighing argument allegedly replaces the inherency argument vital to the traditional case.¹⁵

The weighing process is where the five points of judgments in the systems model merge in the critical process. The key to weighing is impact, of which Klumpp, *et. al.*, advance three principles:

(1) other things being equal, the greater the probability of the policy options generating the effect, the greater the impact, (2) other things being equal, the greater the significance of the effect generated by the alternative, the greater the impact, (3) other things being equal, the more important the goal or value involved, the greater the impact.¹⁶

Argument will take place over probability, significance, and value, then center on the total comparative impact of advantages and disadvantages of various policy options.

To sum up, the systems model views debate as consisting of the comparison of policy systems. According to Lichtman, Rohrer, and Misner, "comparison" in the systems model means that the affirmative and negative argue for some policy or policies and the winner is the one whose policy is best among those being compared. "System" implies that the policy arrangements being compared are typically complex, multifaceted, and interrelated entities that are defined not only statically by their structure but dynamically by their goals, behavior, and interactions.¹⁷

Underlying a number of the new affirmative cases is systems analysis, and these cases are better understood when viewed in light of this form of analysis. Thomas is correct when he announced, "Debate has changed," and systems analysis may be another reason why it has changed and why there is a surfeit of affirmative cases.

Next, seven of the affirmative case possibilities are described: the need-plan-advantages, the comparative advantages, goals-criteria, alternative-justification, effect-oriented, on-balance, and comparative need cases.

1. NEEDS-PLAN-ADVANTAGES

Often called the "traditional" affirmative, the need-plan-advantages case places its primary emphasis, first, on the existence of a serious problem as stated in the debate resolution and, second, the inherent inability of the status quo to overcome that problem. Those using the case reason that there is a problem that needs to be solved and that in the present state of affairs the problem is aggravated. Therefore, a new way of dealing with the problem--the proposed solution--should be tried. Not only will this solution overcome the present difficulties, but it will also produce additional advantages, claim those who advocate this affirmative approach.

Used almost exclusively until the middle 1960's, this affirmative alternative seems appropriate for virtually every college and high school debate proposition conceived. It is simple, straightforward, and readily lends itself to stock issue analysis.

The following outline represents one conception of how the traditional case could be covered in the constructive speeches.

First Affirmative Constructive

- I. Greeting and statement of the proposition
- II. Definition of terms
- III. Statement of the affirmative philosophy and objectives
- IV. Preview of the affirmative case
 - A. The needs in presummary form
 - B. The division of labor between partners
- V. The needs
 - A. Problems with the status quo
 - B. Causes of the problem
 - C. Causes are inherent in status quo

VI. Summary

Second Affirmative Constructive

- I. Greeting and preview of what this speech will cover
- II. Restatement of needs presented by first affirmative with rebuttal of negative attack on each need.
- III. Refutation of negative case
- IV. The plan
- V. The advantages of the plan
- VI. Summary of complete affirmative case
- VII. Appeal for adoption of the proposition

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2. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES

A product of the 1960's, the comparative advantages case caught the tide of change and rode the crest of popularity to the present. Limited in application, the case is usually misused by neophyte coaches and debaters, by those desiring a ride on the bandwagon, or by those seeking a competitive advantage. The case is properly used when real, inherent and significantly damaging evils do not seem to exist in the present system. Since there is no compelling harm, the debate revolves around two policies: the present as normally upheld by the negative, and the new, supposedly more advantageous policy or plan advocated by the affirmative.

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Because this case compares a new policy with the old, the plan is presented first, since it isn't possible to compare the two policies until the proposed policy is known. Following the other plan, its advantages are given and these provide a rationale for making the change. The advantages must be both "significant" and "inherent" to the proposition. They must be significant in the sense that they are more important, momentous and better than the advantages of the status quo. They must be inherent in

that they are unique to the plan, which is to say, the advantages can only be achieved by adopting the proposal.

The following outline suggests a way to structure the comparative advantages case, frequently presented entirely by the First Affirmative Constructive speaker.

- I. Introduction and statement of the proposition
- II. Definition of terms
- III. The plan
- IV. The plan's advantages
- V. Comparison of the advantages with the conditions of the status quo
- VI. Demonstration of significance and inherency of the advantages
- VII. Summary

3. GOALS-CRITERIA

A number of affirmative cases of varying sophistication have appeared under the labels such as "criteria," "rationale," and "goal."²⁰ All seem to be similar enough to lump together under the goals-criteria heading, and the case described here represents such an amalgamation.

A goals-criteria case is an affirmative case which feature goals built on value judgments. The goals act as the criteria by which the acceptability of the proposal is judged. In this type of case, the affirmative sets forth goals which are not operating in the present system yet embody the theoretical requirements of the resolution. The plan advocated by the affirmative provides the means to implement these goals²¹ which supposedly will produce benefits to society.

The "goals" dealt with can be broadly based in postulated fundamental tenets or values of society (e.g., recognition of life's sanctity, keeping the world safe for democracy, and maintaining national security)

or, the goals can be more limited by being oriented to the values found in the subject matter of the debate proposition. An example of such goals comes from the first affirmative's opening remarks in the 1968 National Debate Tournament final debate:

In June, 1966, the Advisory Council on Public Welfare reported to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare that "the elimination of poverty and the achievement for all its people of social justice, basic security, and opportunities for self-realization are the announced goals of the Great Society." To better implement those goals, Bob and I are resolved that the federal government should guarantee a minimum annual cash income to all citizens.²²

In either case, the goals are chosen because they are deemed desirable
²³
 bases upon which a policy is formulated.

The goals advocated by the affirmative must be new goals, that is, ones not sought by the status quo or ones not operative in the present system. Thus, a major emphasis in this case is for the affirmative to discover new goals on which to base policy judgments. The fault with many affirmative teams building goals-criteria cases is that their goals are consistent with or included in the status quo. Their goals are not new goals and their case should be more appropriately ruled something other
²⁴
 than goals-criteria.

A goals-criteria case may be presented in two forms. In the first format the affirmative chooses to assert the element of the present policy with which it disagrees and then offers its new goals. Kimball cites this example:

In debating the reduction of United States military aid to foreign nations, some affirmatives argued that containment of communism, for which this aid was originally intended, was no longer a viable policy goal. Instead, they argued, building stability through economic aid represents a more contemporary and useful policy goal.²⁵

The policy is defended with traditional needs or comparative advantages

arguments.

The second format is more detailed and involves a more sophisticated analysis. The policy goals and their values are detailed along with the reasoning which underlies present programs. The affirmative introduces this series of assumptions as a value chain. Then, somewhere in the chain, the affirmative rejects present thinking and injects a new set of standards for policy evaluation. Once the new standards or goals are outlined and supported, the affirmative contrasts the ability of its plan to meet them with the inability of the present system to do so.²⁶ The affirmative is required to defend the goals throughout the debate because all major issues are analyzed by using the goals as a criteria for comparing the new proposal with the status quo.

In developing the goals-criteria case, Winters advocates the use of the following organization pattern:

- I. Present a philosophy or observation of the case.
- II. Establish the goal or goals that should be attained.
 - A. Demonstrate that the goals are worth attaining.
- III. State the resolution formally.
- IV. Define the terms of the resolution.
- V. Present the affirmative plan.
- VI. First major contention.
 - A. Establish the significance of the harm when the goal is unfulfilled by the status quo.
 - B. Present the inherent reason the status quo is precluded from attaining the goal.
 - C. Establish how the new proposal better meets or attains the goal than the status quo.
- VII. Second major contention (optional--used to support second goal).
 - A. Use the same pattern established under part VI.

VIII. Summarize debate.

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IX. Present closing statement.

Cheseboro defends the legitimacy of the goals-criteria case and argues that it provides a more effective and substantial approach for debating the goals underlying policy actions and the values those goals support. He claims that this case is valuable in that it (1) provides an opportunity to determine the prima facie requirements for a proposition of value, (2) forces debaters to analyze substantively, attack, and defend values as a structural part of affirmative analysis, and (3) more realistically features the significance of the value itself as part of policy formulation. 28

4. ALTERNATIVE-JUSTIFICATION

Allegedly introduced by Harvard University debaters in 1972, the alternative-justification case borders on pure gamesmanship and is viewed as unethical, although its proponents vigorously defend its use. 29

The case, according to Lichtman, Garvin, and Corsi, "offers in a single debate, two or more parallel affirmative plans, each of which is a legitimate, if narrow, interpretation of the debate resolution." 30 While the comparative advantages case defends one policy for several independent reasons, the alternative-justification case upholds several independent policies, each with its own advantages. Supposedly the comparative advantages case can win by successfully defending any one of its advantages; the alternative-justification case also can win by successfully defending any one of its plans, argue Lichtman, Garvin, and Corsi. 31 The case, therefore, advances several sets of plan-advantage relationships, each of which is independent of the others and each a legitimate interpretation of and justification for the resolution. 32

The structure of this case perhaps is more clearly understood with an example. Lichtman, Garvin, and Corsi designed the following illustration for the resolution. "Resolved: that federal government should establish a system of compulsory wage and price controls."

- I. The resolution will guard against the ravages of inflation.
Plan setting a percentage ceiling on all wage and price increases.
 - A. Inflation generates harmful distortions in the economic system.
 - B. Current efforts are incapable of halting inflation.
 - C. Strict controls can effectively halt inflation.
- II. The resolution will protect the poor from economic discrimination.
Plan outlawing excessively high food prices in ghetto areas and establishing higher minimum wages.
 - A. Unreasonably low wages and high prices afflict the American poor.
 - B. No mechanism exists to curb this ghetto-gouging.
 - C. Federal controls can stop ghetto-gouging.
- III. The resolution will minimize the suffering of the chronically ill.
Plan lowering the prices of patent medicines and regulating pharmacists' wages.
 - A. Millions of chronically ill cannot afford necessary prescription drugs.
 - B. Present controls on prescription costs are ineffective.
 - C. Federal wage and price standards will guarantee lower prescription costs.³³

In the example, three plans are presented, each a justifiable alternative to the status quo. Each, of course, must satisfy the burden of proof and fulfill the requirements of significance and inherency demanded in any of the other affirmative approaches. The example reveals a principal fault of the alternative-justification case: too many issues are introduced into the debate, with a possible reduction in the quality of analysis.

The case is faulted for other reasons, one of which is the reasoning behind the case. The logic seems to suggest: "it doesn't make much

difference if the judge accepts all the plans but by accepting at least one, the affirmative wins." Thus, advocating a new policy isn't the goal; winning the debate is.

5. EFFECT-ORIENTED

An occasional proposition involves a problem the basic cause of which is impossible or undesirable to eliminate. Then the effect-oriented case has great utilitarian value, George W. Ziegelmüller and Charles³⁴ A. Dause content in their book, Argumentation: Inquiry and Advocacy. This case treats the harms of the present system without removing the inherent causes of the harms. The crucial aspect of this case is the plan. The affirmative conceives a plan that is capable of operating within the framework of the present system yet is different in principle from the present. The plan alleviates the harms of the present while allowing their causes to remain.

The rationale of the case may be better understood through a simple illustration. Joe drives a truck for a delivery company. Efficient, polite and personable, he represents the company well and is a definite asset dealing with customers. However, he gets into a lot of accidents and bangs up the truck he drives. Apparently a cultural belief of his is the cause of the accidents. His culture does not attach much significance to material things and as a consequence he treats such things with indifference. Realizing Joe's value as a company contact with customers, the company solved the accident problem by hiring a driver to assist Joe in deliveries. The company, thus, alleviated the harms of the present system, the truck damage, but not the cause, Joe's attitude toward material things. The effects-oriented case operates in that fashion.

A proposition concerned with a problem caused by a deep-seated attitude, as in Joe's case, would ideally fit the effects-oriented case, Ziegelmueller and Dause believe. They feel that "cases built on so-called attitudinal inherency arguments should utilize the effect-oriented approach." Such arguments identify an unchanging attitude as the cause. The attitude is allegedly inherent and it cannot be removed, therefore,³⁵ it must be circumvented.

6. ON-BALANCE

This case is developed according to the need-plan-benefits approach or the comparative advantages approach, depending upon the proposition debated. Basically, the on-balance case argues that the high costs of the present policy do not offset the few benefits realized but the proposition offers a policy not as costly with more benefits--the costs are on-balance, so to speak. The need-plan-benefits structure fits this approach when there is an obvious, inherent cause responsible for the high costs while the comparative advantages structure works when there is no identifiable inherent cause for the costs.

Useful for those propositions where the affirmative should maximize the costs, the cost issue is developed by demonstrating that the status quo is either ineffective or unnecessary, and alleged benefits can be obtained in other ways, and the cost of abandoning the present policy in favor of the new one will be nil. For example, some foreign policy experts contend that the U.S.A. should not intervene militarily in other country's internal affairs. The costs are too high in lost lives, supplies, and loss of prestige, while the gains are few, if any at all. The few benefits, if any, could have been achieved without military intervention,

and lives, supplies, and possible loss of prestige from military failure could have been saved.³⁶

7. COMPARATIVE-NEED

The close of the 1960's saw the advent of comparative-need cases. Useful for propositions with a less than all-pervading evil, the case bears a resemblance to the comparative advantages approach and, in fact, it may be an appropriate alternative to the comparative advantages when there is a comparatively potential harm.

When using this case, the affirmative recognizes that a degree of harm exists in the status quo, and though that harm is not so great as to cause immediate disastrous effects, it nevertheless exists and will continue to do so or even become a "significant" harm unless the status quo is changed. Or, the affirmative recognizes that a harm could occur in the future unless the status quo is changed.

In developing the case, the affirmative first sets forth an observation or two about the status quo on which their case will hinge. For example, an affirmative using the comparative-need case with the proposition. "Resolved: That the Federal Government should adopt a comprehensive program to control land use in the United States," would find a comparative need in energy production and could advance the observation, "the United States has an increased need for energy." After proving the accuracy of the observation, the affirmative in its second stage of analysis would examine contentions that, compared to the present system, a harm exists and it stems from the status quo. In the energy example, the affirmative could show that the United States has such an abundant coal supply that it could take care of all energy needs for the next hundred

years. If coal fields are developed, a harm in the status quo would be eliminated, that is, the inflationary balance of trade deficit coming from dependence on foreign oil which while "high" now but acceptable, because of the demand, it could become disastrous if allowed to continue. This harm although a less than all-pervading one does exist and it stems from present land use policies. Then, the affirmative shows that the comparative harm would be removed by the adoption of the affirmative resolution and presents its plan and the advantages that handle the harm.

The case revolves around what appears to be a potential harm, or harms, comparatively speaking, the the status quo which nonetheless should be dealt with and can be dealt with through the resolution's adoption.³⁷

CONCLUSION

The state of the affirmative case is: it is changing. No longer is the needs-plan-advantages the only way to debate the affirmative as it had been for roughly forty years. Nor is the comparative advantages the only alternative form as it had been for a few years. Today the affirmative can also develop its analysis around the goals-criteria, alternative-justification, effect-oriented, on-balance, and comparative-need approaches.

Whether any approach except the traditional one is justifiable may be open to debate, at least Arthur N. Kruger seems to think so, and his case is persuasive. He takes exception to the system analysis model³⁸ because he believes that this type of analysis involves public policy decision-making which emerges in group discussion not debate. The situation in debate is entirely different. In debate a specific policy, that proposed in the resolution, must be defended. The affirmative debater

must find convincing reasons for adopting the policy, a policy which represents a significant departure from the status quo.

He does not have the luxury of defending a minor change, of considering alternative courses (except for the purpose of rejecting them), or of repairing the status quo. He must defend a policy--the one given to him by the debate proposition--which is either a complete reversal of existing policy or completely contrary to it.

The affirmative has the burden of convincing the listener that an important gain will accrue from the new policy which the status quo cannot supply. Then Kruger sets forth this concluding point:

This logic leads us again to the so-called traditional analysis, which involves presumption and burden of proof, the prima facie case, the inherent need(s) for change, and the concomitant advantages of the affirmative plan. Given the nature of the debate proposition, there is no escaping this analysis, however old-fashioned it may seem and however burdensome it may be to the affirmative.³⁹

While Kruger debates the merits of the newer affirmatives, the newer affirmative cases are being used by debaters all over the nation. Gamesmanship, jumping on the bandwagon, policy systems analysis, whatever the reason, change characterizes the state of the affirmative.

FOOTNOTES

1. Joe McAdoo, Judging Debate (Springfield, Missouri: Mid-America Research, 1975), p. 110.
2. Lawrence R. Wheelless, "Two Surveys on Debate Format Preferences of Debaters and Coaches," Journal of the American Forensic Association, VII (Winter, 1972), 132.
3. McAdoo, p. 110.
4. John E. Baird, "Confucius Say: Debate is Great," Journal of the American Forensic Association, VIII (Winter, 1972), 139.
5. Baird (139-140) on this subject says, "All national debate questions must be too remote for interest, too broad for mastery, roundly condemned as undebatable by all experts in the subject matter, and repeated under different forms on average of once every three years."
6. William Reynolds, "Theory and Practice in Forensics," Forensics as Communication, ed. James H. McBath (Skokie, Illinois: National Textbook Co., 1975), pp. 111-12.
7. Reynolds, p. 116.
8. Reynolds, p. 116.
9. Reynolds, p. 117.
10. Bernard L. Brock, James W. Cheseboro, John F. Cragen and James F. Klumpp, Public Policy Decision-making: Systems Analysis and Comparative Advantages Debate (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).
11. James F. Klumpp, Bernard L. Brock, James W. Cheseboro, and John F. Cragen, "Implications of a Systems Model of Analysis on Argumentation Theory," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XI, (Summer, 1974), 1-7. Kruger claims that the systems approach is based on a fundamental ambiguity. To quote Kruger from his article, "On Systems Analysis in Debate: A Comment," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XI (Spring, 1974), 222: "There is a fundamental ambiguity about the essay on systems analysis in argumentation by Klumpp, et. al. Basically, what Klumpp, et. al. fail to grasp is that 'public policy decision-making' is not necessarily the same thing as debating the adoption of a given controversial policy. Indeed, from their description of 'public policy decision-making,' it is apparent that they regard it as the kind of decision-making or problem-solving which emerges in group discussion. It most assuredly is not the kind of decision-making which results from debate."
12. James H. McBurney and Glen E. Mills, Argumentation and Debate (New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 50.
13. Klumpp, et. al., p. 2.

14. Klumpp, et. al., p. 3.
15. Klumpp, et. al., p. 6.
16. Klumpp, et. al., p. 6.
17. Allan J. Lichtman, Daniel M. Rohrer, and Josepf, "The Role of Empirical Evidence in Debate: A Systems Approach," Debate Issues, XI (October, 1975), 1.
18. Donald W. Klopff and James C. McCroskey, Elements of Debate (New York: Arco Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 73-74.
19. Donald R. Terry, Modern Debate Case Techniques (Skokie, Illinois: National Textbook Company, 1970), p. 16. Marilyn J. Young in recounting this case's history claims that the case was developed because (1) the need-plan-advantages alternative did not always lend itself well to all debate propositions and (2) debate coaches believed that policy decisions in real life are not always based on the need for a change. To elaborate on the second reason, policy-makers, she contends, do more often choose policies on the basis of the advantages they present rather than on the basis of some compelling harm. Thus, the comparative case brings debate into line with decision-making reality. See Marilyn J. Young, Coaching Debate (Clayton, Missouri: The Alan Company, 1975), pp. 1-47.
20. See these articles for detailed analyses of the cases: James W. Cheseboro, "Beyond the Orthodox: The Criteria Case," Journal of the American Forensic Association, VII (Winter, 1971), 208-15; John D. Lewinski, Bruce R. Metzler, and Peter L. Settle, "The Goal Case Affirmative: An Alternative Approach to Academic Debate," Journal of the American Forensic Association, IX (Spring, 1973), 458-463; Allan Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer, "The Role of the Criteria Case in the Conceptual Framework of Academic Debate," in Modern Debate Case Techniques, pp. 20-61. Clark D. Kimball, "A Critique of the Criteria Case from a Negative View," in Modern Debate Case Techniques, says (p. 70) "... it is fair to conclude that many cases labeled 'rationale' [goals, criteria] represent nothing more than a new label for traditional or advantages approaches." In his article, he gives an example of such instances.
21. Cheseboro, 208.
22. Klopff and McCroskey, p. 146.
23. Modern Debate Case Techniques, p. 66.
24. See Lewinski, Metzler and Settle, p. 458, and Kimball, p. 66.
25. Modern Debate Case Techniques, p. 69.
26. Modern Debate Case Techniques, pp. 69-70.
27. Paul Winters, "The Affirmative Case" (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Debate Institute, 1975). (mimeographed).

28. Cheseboro, p. 209.
29. The incomplete returns of a "debate ethics" survey being conducted by Klopff during the time of this article was being written revealed that 100% of the respondents (college forensic directors) considered the case unethical.
30. Allan Lichtman, Charles Garvin, and Jerry Corsi, "The Alternative-Justification Affirmative: A New Case Form," Journal of the American Forensic Association, X (Fall, 1973), 60.
31. Lichtman, Garvin, and Corsi, p. 61.
32. Robert V. Seltzer, "The Alternative-Justification Affirmative: Practical and Theoretical Implications," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XI (Winter, 1974), 131.
33. Lichtman, Garvin, and Corsi, p. 61.
34. George W. Ziegelmüller and Charles A. Dause, Argumentation: Inquiry and Advocacy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975), p. 166.
35. Ziegelmüller and Dause, p. 166.
36. Ziegelmüller and Dause, pp. 167-68.
37. Ronald E. Cambra, "The Comparative Need" (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Debate Institute, 1975). (mimeographed).
38. See footnote 11.
39. Kruger, p. 223.